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Petra Vejvodová
Abstract: The article focuses on information and psychological operations as a 
challenge for the security and defence establishments of NATO member 
states. A conceptualisation of the terms ‘information operations’ and 
‘psychological operations’ is discussed in the contexts of reshaping 
the war-and-peace dichotomy, and of resilience and deterrence. It is 
suggested that these terms suffer from a normative approach to the 
paradigm of war and peace, and to the use of non-military means. This 
may lead to the greater vulnerability of security and defence systems 
in confrontation with an adversary. Also, special attention is paid to 
the vulnerabilities of security and armed forces, being overlooked in 
concepts of resilience. 
Abstrakt: Článek se věnuje informačním a psychologickým operacím jako výzvě 
pro bezpečnostní a obranné systémy zemí NATO. Nejprve jsou jednotlivé 
termíny diskutovány v souvislosti s pojímáním dichotomie válka a mír, 
a také v kontextu odolnosti a odstrašování. Text upozorňuje na to, že de-
finice pojmů jsou ovlivněny normativním přístupem vůči paradigmatům 
války a míru a užití nevojenských prostředků. Tato situace vede k vyšší 
zranitelnosti bezpečnostních a obranných systémů při jejich konfrontaci 
s protivníkem. Zvláštní pozornost je také věnována zranitelnostem bez-
pečnostních a ozbrojených složek, které jsou v rámci formulací strategií 
na zvýšení odolnosti přehlíženy. 
Key words: Information Environment; Information Operations; Psychological 
Operations; Resilience; Security Forces; Vulnerability. 
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INTRODUCTION
Information operations, psychological operations: two terms very often articulated 
in the context of hybrid warfare, irregular warfare, information warfare etc. Western 
democracies and NATO try to define carefully what these terms mean to promote as 
much transparency as possible. Nevertheless, we suggest that current definitions do 
not reflect the reality, probably because the Western approach differs from that of the 
West’s adversaries, the ones who actively develop and deploy such operations in the 
modern age. Therefore, this article discusses and highlights the main issues and weak-
nesses related to the Western understanding of information and psychological operati-
ons, and also reflects on the gap in civil-military affairs. We witness intense discussions 
about the protection of society against the influence of information and psychological 
operations, but these reflect only civil society. Military and security representation is 
missing from this discussion.1
1 DIFFICULTIES IN UNDERSTANDING INFORMATION AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
According to NATO and the US Department of Defense, information operations are 
defined as ‘the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-re-
lated capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, 
or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting 
our own.’2 Information operations are coordinated military activities in an information 
environment having specifically defined goals. They represent offensive and defensive 
measures focused on influencing an adversary’s decisions, manipulating information 
and information systems. They also include measures protecting a country’s own decisi-
on-making processes, information and information systems. 
Information operations may affect all three dimensions of the information environ-
ment. In the psychological dimension they have potential to influence command and 
control systems, key decision makers and supporting infrastructure. The physical di-
mension covers human beings, but also command and control facilities and ICT. What 
is important is that the physical dimension is not connected only to military or nation-
-based systems and processes. In the psychological dimension, information operations 
target the ways information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated and protected. 
1  This paper was written under the project Optimisation of Intelligence Activities and Intelligence 
Institutions in the Changing Environment (OPTIZ9070204510), funded by the Ministry of Defence of the 
Czech Republic as part of the ‘Development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic! (907 020) defence 
research programme.
2  Joint Chief of Staff. Joint Publication 3-13. Information operations. [online] 2014 [cit. 2019-04-30]. 
Available at: https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_13.pdf.
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Operations in these dimensions affect the content and flow of information. Last but not 
least, in the cognitive dimension, information operations influence the minds of those 
who transmit, receive, respond to or act on information. The cognitive dimension means 
individuals and groups, their individual and cultural beliefs, norms, vulnerabilities, mo-
tivations, emotions, experiences, education, mental health, identities and ideologies3. 
Understanding these factors is crucial for developing best operations in order to influen-
ce decision makers and produce the desired effect. 
Information operations are not only a collection of single information activities. They 
are a process of integrating the effects of single information activities, together leading 
to influencing an adversary. Information operations integrate psychological operations 
(psyops), operations security, information security, deception, electronic warfare, kinetic 
actions, key leader engagement and computer network operations. All together they 
target the will of adversaries to fight, their understanding of the situation, and their 
capabilities. 
Information activities aimed at influencing the adversary mainly focus on decision-
-makers who have the ability to influence the situation. Activities in this case include 
questioning the legitimacy of political leaders, undermining the morals of the population 
or the military, polarising society and so on. Information activities to affect the under-
standing of the situation seek to influence the information available to the enemy for 
their decision-making processes. They include disseminating disinformation, using mi-
litary-scale mock-ups to fool the enemy’s radar systems, deliberately leaking distorted 
information, destroying or manipulating information in the opponent’s information sys-
tems, and so on. The third kind of information activities is to act on the enemy’s abili-
ties and try to disrupt his ability to understand information and promote his will. These 
include disruptions to internet connections, the physical destruction of infrastructure, 
cyber attacks and so on.
Information operations are sometimes mistakenly referred to as strategic communi-
cation. Although these two terms may seem very similar, there are differences between 
them. Strategic communication is driven from a political, strategic level; its reach and 
audience are global and it operates only in the cognitive dimension of the information 
environment. By contrast, information operations are managed from an operational, mi-
litary level, have a well-defined scope of action and audience, and operate in all three 
dimensions of the information environment.4 Strategic communication is thus a broader 
term to which information operations are subordinate.
In this approach, information operations concentrate information-technical and in-
formation-psychological activities during military operations. In this article, we are inte-
rested in information-psychological activities, which are often understood as psyops. As 
was mentioned, psychological operations are defined as one type of activity belonging 
3  Joint Chief of Staff. Joint Publication 3-13. Information operations. [online] 2014 [cit. 2019-04-30]. 
Available at: https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_13.pdf.
4  DIVIŠOVÁ, Vendula. Strategická komunikace v protipovstaleckých operacích NATO. Obrana a strategie 
[online]. 24(2), 105-118 [cit. 2019-04-30]. ISSN 12146463. Available at: https://www.obranaastrategie.
cz/cs/archiv/rocnik-2014/2-2014/clanky/strategicka-komunikace-v-protipovstaleckych-
operacich-nato.html.; ŘEHKA, Karel. Informační válka. Praha: Academia, 2017. ISBN 978-80-200-2770-2.
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to information operations. Allied Joint Doctrine AJP 3-10.1 for psychological operations 
from 2014 defines psyops as ‘planned activities using methods of communication and 
other means directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes 
and behaviour, affecting the achievements of political and military objectives.’5 It is also 
understood that all actions in the area of operations undertaken by NATO are highly 
probable to have a psychological impact. 
Psychological operations are pre-planned activities using communication methods 
and other resources aimed at selected target audiences to influence their moods, attitu-
des, behaviour, perception and interpretation of reality. Thus, by using special methods, 
it is possible to induce desirable responses in the target population, which in the broader 
context contributes to the fulfilment of specific political and/or military objectives. Every 
psychological operation is based on a certain psychological theme (the main, carefully 
prepared narrative, or ideas). The greater the target audience receptivity, i.e. sensitivity 
to specific psyops tools, the greater the probability of success of the whole psychological 
operation6. 
The importance of psyops is based on the belief that the psychological nature of the 
conflict is as important as the physical. People’s attitudes and behaviour affect the cour-
se and outcome of the conflict and the nature of the environment in which the conflict 
takes place. For a well-conducted psychological operation, it is important to know the 
target audience, its will and motivation. The psyops work with these elements and aim 
to influence them, weakening the adversary’s will, strengthening the target group’s com-
mitment, and gaining the support and cooperation of undecided groups.
The poorly defined relationship between information operations and psychological 
operations is a problem for the definition of psyops themselves. From the logic of pro-
vided definitions, psyops help to fulfil the aims of information operations at the infor-
mation-psychological level of military operations. Aiming at the cognitive dimension of 
the information environment, psyops influence the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour 
of the target audience, which should lead to an effect on decision makers. So they are 
a sub-category of information operations, coordinated through information operations 
processes. Allied Joint Doctrine AJP 3-10.1 states that psyops are conducted across the 
5  NATO Standardization Office. Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations AJP 3-10.1. [online] 
Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Standardization Office, 2014 [cit. 2019-04-30]. 
Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/450521/20150223-AJP_3_10_1_PSYOPS_with_UK_Green_pages.pdf. 
6  NATO Standardization Office. Slovník NATO s termíny a definicemi. AAP-06(2016). [online] Praha: Úřad pro 
obrannou standardizaci, katalogizaci a státní ověřování jakosti, Odbor obranné standardizace, 2016 [cit. 
2019-04-30]. Available at: http://oos.army.cz/terminologicky-slovnik-aap-6; NATO Standardization Office. 
NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. AAP-06. [online] Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
NATO Standardization Office, 2018 [cit. 2019-04-30]. Available at: http://oos.army.cz/terminologicky-
slovnik-aap-6; NATO Standardization Office. Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations. Allied Joint 
Publication – 3.10.1. Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Standardization Office, 2014. 
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full spectrum of military operations7. Here, a first contradiction arises, when we compa-
re the NATO understanding of psyops with the understanding of the Czech army, which 
sees psyops as „planned and purposeful psychological influence on target groups, ca-
rried out in peacetime under a state of external threat to the country, and in wartime“8. 
Based on this, psyops can be conducted both in times of peace and war. In this under-
standing, psyops erase the dichotomy between peace and war and imply a shift in the 
understanding of the tasks of the armed forces to the effect that even during peacetime 
the security and defence establishments needs to be active and conduct operations. But 
as a sub-category of information operations, psyops should be connected only with mi-
litary operations – normally undertaken during war. Support for a redefinition of terms 
comes from e.g. Brangetto and Veenendaal from NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence in 
their paper, in which they introduce psychological operations as an activity also under-
taken during peacetime. They talk about a category of operations they describe as „stra-
tegic communication and propaganda9” (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Psyops vs Info ops (modified according to Brangetto and Veenendal)
The intention is clear here, but it causes another terminological confusion when mi-
xing strategic communication and psychological operations that comes from that fact 
that in NATO terminology psyops are replaced by strategic communication (stratcom). It 
7  NATO Standardization Office. Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations AJP 3-10.1. [online] 
Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Standardization Office, 2014 [cit. 2019-04-30]. 
Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/450521/20150223-AJP_3_10_1_PSYOPS_with_UK_Green_pages.pdf. 
8  103rd Centre of Civil-military cooperation and psychological operations of the Czech Army. [online] Official 
website [cit. 2019-04-30]. Available at: http://www.103cp.army.cz/.
9  BRANGETTO, Pascal, VEENDENDAAL, Matthijs, A. Influence Cyber Operations: the Use of Cyberattacks in 
Support of Influence Operations. 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict. Tallinn: NATO CCD COE 
Publications, 2016.
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may be better to say that the definitions of both are the same in principle. On one hand, 
Allied Joint Doctrine AJP 3-10.1 defines psyops as subordinated to stratcom and fulfilling 
the goal of supporting the Alliance’s aims, policies, operations and activities, including 
the strategic narrative. On the other hand, psyops are defined by the same principles as 
stratcom, especially in terms of attribution, credibility, consistency and truthfulness. It is 
said that psyops have to be based on true information and preserving Alliance credibility, 
so they are generally attributable to NATO, a partner nation or organisation. Psyops are 
also nested within the strategic narrative and overall information strategy.10 This under-
standing might be problematic. Respectively, psychological operations overlap with 
strategic communication with an emphasis on the narrative. Nevertheless, in contrast 
to strategic communication, psychological operations may in theory use disinformation 
and propaganda and may try to manipulate target audiences with false or misleading 
information. Like propaganda, psychological operations can be divided into white, grey 
and black psyops based on the source and accuracy of information, and the methods 
used. White psyops activities are openly acknowledged by the sponsor. Grey ones do not 
specifically reveal their sources. Black ones deceive about the source, pretending that 
it is other than the true one. In these terms, psyops are subordinate to the concept of 
strategic communication (especially with white psyops), but psyops may go well beyond 
the frame of principles of stratcom and use dirty measures in order to influence a target 
audience.
Let’s come back to understanding information operations and psychological operati-
ons in practical terms and consider what consequences might follow. The contradiction 
in terms of when to apply such operations (peacetime vs. wartime) has already been 
mentioned. Western democracies believe that such operations should be associated 
with military operations only. They also believe that deception, disinformation and pro-
paganda should be avoided as tools to be used during operations. The Western appro-
ach builds on the belief that carefully developed narratives can only be effective if the 
messages are reliable and consistent. The approach also counts on the critical thinking 
of audiences so that the truthful narrative will win11. What is more, using disinformation 
and deception do not theoretically belong in a democracy’s peace-time toolbox at all. 
As a side effect, this approach prevents us from building a comprehensive, complex and 
functional approach to psyops, which is needed based on our experience with the Eas-
tern approach to this issue. 
As we have seen, Russia and China have adopted integrated and holistic approaches, 
which include information and psychological operations as tools that can be used both 
in peacetime and during an armed conflict. This approach stands on the belief that stra-
tegic advantage can be reached by using non-military means. Non-military means can 
10  NATO Standardization Office. Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations AJP 3-10.1. [online] 
Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Standardization Office, 2014 [cit. 2019-04-30]. 
Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/450521/20150223-AJP_3_10_1_PSYOPS_with_UK_Green_pages.pdf. 
11  BRANGETTO, Pascal, VEENDENDAAL, Matthijs, A. Influence Cyber Operations: the Use of Cyberattacks in 
Support of Influence Operations. 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict. Tallinn: NATO CCD COE 
Publications, 2016.
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allow political or strategic goals to be reached without the conflict being escalated into 
an armed one and officially recognised as such, thus activating an armed response. Eligi-
ble non-military means used might be economic manipulation, disinformation and pro-
paganda, and fostering civil disobedience. Influencing the consciousness of the masses 
is an aspect of the rivalry between different countries.12 Such an approach then exploits 
the weaknesses of the Western approach. 
Another weakness of the current understanding of information and psychological 
operations is that it overlooks one important target audience – the security and armed 
forces, i.e. those responsible for protection and defence and for deploying such opera-
tions. The current understanding of operations and preparedness for action focuses on 
four levels according to who is influenced by whom: 
1. Own security/armed forces influencing adversary’s general public (both informati-
on-technical and information-psychological level);
2. Own security/armed forces influencing adversary’s security/armed forces (both 
information-technical and information-psychological level);
3. Own general public being affected by the adversary (both information-technical 
and information-psychological level);
4. Own security/armed forces being affected by the adversary (only information-
-technical level).
What is missing here is a notion of the vulnerability of own security/armed forces 
being the target audience of information and psychological operations at the informa-
tion-psychological level (i.e. targeting their hearts and minds). That this is the case is 
demonstrated in the next section. 
2 INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AGAINST 
SECURITY/ARMED FORCES
One well-known example are the psychological and information operations under-
taken by ISIS against the security forces of their enemy nations. Examples include a 2015 
video recording of the brutal burning of a Royal Jordanian Air Force pilot, Moaz al-Ka-
sasbeh, whose F-16 fighter jet was shot down near the city of Raqqa in Syria. The 22-mi-
nute video was published on a Twitter account used by ISIS. The pilot died in flames, 
locked in a cage. The video was used for propaganda, to send out the threatening me-
ssage that any soldier fighting against ISIS would die a remorseless death. The video was 
professionally shot, using multiple cameras and following a script, and complemented 
12  MONAGHAN, Andrew. The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’. Parameters [online]. 45 (4) (inter 2015-
2016), 65-75 [cit. 2019-04-30]. ISSN 0031-1723. Available at: https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/
parameters/issues/winter_2015-16/9_monaghan.pdf; RING, A. Teylur. Russian Information Operations 
and the Rise of the Global Internet. Master Thesis. Washington DC: University of Washington, 2015.
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with sound effects intended to engender fear. Before murdering the pilot, ISIS published 
an ‘interview’ with him in its English-language propaganda magazine.
ISIS, or more precisely the ‘ISIS Hacking Division’, a group linked with it, published 
personal information of 100 current and past members of the US armed forces. The in-
formation included the names, home addresses and photographs of people who fought 
against ISIS. In its original online appeal, the ‘Hacking Division’ incited its followers to 
attack these military personnel, and indeed some people from the list or their family 
members became targets of verbal attacks on Facebook. But ISIS also called on its sym-
pathisers to track these people to their homes and kill them. Personal information was 
collected from the internet – specifically, social networks. In response to this incident, 
the US government appealed to members of its security forces to limit their activities on 
social networks. The US Marine Corps instructed its members and their families to check 
their footprint on the internet, to verify the settings of their social networking accounts 
and to limit the amount of personal information they shared online. So far, the autho-
rities have not sought to ban the use of social networks entirely. The US armed forces 
have issued instructions on how to use social networks as safely as possible, including 
advice on blocking access to the user’s position, and advised armed forces personnel 
not to accept friend requests from people they do not know. On the opposite side, ISIS 
takes an essentially similar position, banning its fighters from using social networks to 
avoid surveillance from intelligence agencies. In May 2017, ISIS issued an official ban to 
all its fighters.
Of course, there have been multiple instances of ISIS intimidation on social networks. 
For instance, the Twitter account of US Command was hacked and the following me-
ssage posted: ‘American soldiers, we are coming, watch your back!’13 The group Gasper 
CyberCaliphate Sadz hacked the Twitter account of Military Spouses of Strength and sent 
threats to partners of US soldiers via Twitter and Facebook. The following message was 
posted on Twitter: ‘You think you’re safe but IS is already here. #CyberCaliphate got into 
your PC and smartphone.’ The messages sent to soldiers’ wives contained death threats: 
‘We know everything about you, your husband and your children and we’re much closer 
than you can ever imagine. You’ll see no mercy, infidel!’; ‘While your president and your 
husband are killing our brothers in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan we’re coming for you.’14
ISIS (also known as Daesh) has used mobile phones for intimidation, sending text 
messages to enemy soldiers. For instance, it nearly paralysed the Iraqi army units which 
were supposed to fight near Mosul in 2014. The message sent to soldiers was, ‘Daesh 
is here’. They were also sent information that ISIS controlled Mosul and had released 
thousands of extremists from prison. The soldiers were so affected by the campaign that 
13  COOPER, Helen. ISIS Is Cited in Hacking of Central Command’s Twitter and YouTube Accounts. New York 
Times [online]. 12 January, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-30]. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/
us/isis-is-cited-in-hacking-of-central-commands-twitter-feed.html.
14  MARTINEZ, Michael. Cyberwar: CyberCaliphate targets U.S. military spouses; Anonymous hits ISIS. CNN 
[online]. 11 February 2015 [cit. 2019-04-30]. Available at: https://edition-m.cnn.com/2015/02/10/
us/isis-cybercaliphate-attacks-cyber-battles/index.html?r=https%3A%2F%2Fedition.cnn.
com%2F2015%2F02%2F10%2Fus%2Fisis-cybercaliphate-attacks-cyber-battles%2Findex.html.
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they refused to go further or to obey orders. They literally threw away their uniforms 
and weapons and deserted.
Psychological and information operations are also known from the ongoing Russo-
-Ukrainian conflict. As part of its information war, Russia conducts psychological opera-
tions against the Ukrainian armed forces, the aim of which is to undermine the morale 
of Ukrainian soldiers and to spread panic and fear among them. Mobile phones are used 
for this purpose to send intimidating text messages to Ukrainian armed forces fighting 
the pro-Russian separatists. This method of conducting psychological operations has 
been called ‘pinpoint propaganda’, and can be seen as an updated version of leaflets 
dropped from aircraft on to enemy territory. The sending of messages has been ascri-
bed to the Russian armed forces, which have an IMSI catcher device at their disposal15. 
Normally, the police and intelligence services use such devices legitimately for the surve-
illance and apprehension of criminals, but according to Ukraine’s cybernetic police, they 
are employed there for the purposes of psychological warfare. In eastern Ukraine, since 
2014 propaganda messages have been sent through the largest Ukrainian mobile servi-
ces provider, Kyivstar, owned by a Russian company. Examples of such messages include: 
‘Soldier, if you want to live, go home.’ ‘Welcome to the Donetsk People’s Republic. Your 
generals are cowards and liars.’ ‘Your commanders have fled because they know the war 
is already lost. You’re alone and no-one will help you.’16 Messages threatening Ukrainian 
soldiers that they will be killed unless they leave, are not rare either. Similar messages 
are sent to soldiers’ families and friends. 
Several investigations into the origin of these messages suggest that Leer-3, a Russian 
system for electronic combat, is being used in Ukraine and is known to be deployed by 
Russia in Syria17. At a 2016 plenary session of the Organisation for Security and Coope-
ration in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, the Ukrainian delegation 
produced evidence of this system’s presence in Donetsk18.
Last but not least, disinformation and manipulated news can also affect members 
of the security forces even when they are not themselves the direct target of the disin-
formation. Many quasi-news websites seek to pose as alternative news sources, often 
claiming that – unlike mainstream or traditional media – they do not hide ‘the truth’. 
These on-line media report on domestic and international events, and often offer what 
they call an ‘alternative explanation of reality’ or ‘alternative facts’ (which, of course, is 
15  CHIRGWIN, Richard. Someone is sending propaganda texts to Ukrainian soldiers. The Register 
[online]. 2017 [cit. 2019-04-30].  Available at: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/12/
someone_is_sending_propaganda_texts_to_ukranian_soldiers/.
16  KOPOTIN, Igor, SAZONOV, Vladimir. Russia’s Information Warfare against Ukraine II: Influences on the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine [online]. Estonian National Defence College, 2015 [cit. 2019-04-30]. Available at: 
http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/RUSSIA-%E2%80%99S-INFORMATION-WARFARE-
AGAINST-UKRAINE-II-koolon-INFLUENCES-ON-THE-ARMED-FORCES-OF-UKRAINE.pdf.
17  DFRLab. Electronic Warfare by Drone and SMS: How Russia-backed separatists use ‘pinpoint propaganda’ 
in the Donbas. Medium [online]. 2017 [cit. 2019-04-30]. Available at: https://medium.com/dfrlab/
electronic-warfare-by-drone-and-sms-7fec6aa7d696.
18  OSCE. Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the 822nd FSC Plenary Meeting [online]. 2016 [cit. 2019-
04-30]. Available at: https://www.osce.org/fsc/252856?download=true.
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a logical impossibility). Some of these media are directly state-orchestrated (for exam-
ple, Russia’s RT and Sputnik); others are independent of states but directed by peo-
ple who support the geopolitical, security, civilisational etc. interests of other powers, 
or they simply prefer the worldviews of these powers to those offered by the West. 
Ideologically, they are closer to conservative, nationalist and authoritarian views than 
to liberalism and democracy. Their online disinformation works on the same principle, 
customising their interpretations of domestic and world events to the values of read-
ers who tend to be anti-EU, anti-NATO and often right-wing. They also skilfully work 
with their readership’s emotions and, through eliciting various sentiments, manipulate 
their opinions. Principles of cognitive dissonance and cognitive bias play an important 
role in this. A 2017 study by experts of the Indiana University School of Informatics and 
Computing shows that it does not matter whether the information given is provided by 
fact-checked or low-credibility articles (or even pieces of outright disinformation). Both 
types have the same chance of success with non-biased audiences19. We already have 
preconceived opinions on the bulk of the information we receive. Theories of cognitive 
dissonance and cognitive bias say that people have a natural tendency to accept infor-
mation that upholds their position and keeps their behaviours in harmony, i.e. does not 
cause dissonance or inner tension. This leads us to false reasoning and decisions and 
the faulty remembering of information. We naturally tend to choose information that 
confirms our opinions. Members of the security/armed forces are as vulnerable as the 
population at large. 
Besides already existing tools affecting the security/armed forces we can expect in the 
near future threats connected with artificial intelligence and machine learning proce-
sses. These might newly affect not only security/armed forces, but the general public as 
well. One of them might be madcom (machine-driven communication). Madcom refers 
to a state where artificial intelligence offers a multitude of tools and ways to manipula-
te the human mind, integrating artificial intelligence systems into robotic propaganda 
tools. This propaganda is then spread by an automated profile on social networks. By 
using sophisticated algorithms, this profile may produce its own content.20 The develo-
pment of madcom is expected to improve so-called chatbots. A chatbot (or also a chat 
robot) is a computer program designed for automated communication that asks people 
questions based on a predefined scenario. Chatbots have already been used in e-shops, 
and in communication applications such as Messenger and Skype. They communicate 
with clients in order to process online order returns or they help in choosing a product. 
With a set of questions, the chatbot finds out what the customer is interested in and 
redirects him or her to the product/manual. It is also expected that in the near future 
chatbots will learn to produce dynamic content based on psychological user profiling.
Above all, the security threats associated with madcom are that it is a tool 
that has the potential to spread highly personalised propaganda and disinformation 
19  SHAO, Chengcheng et al. The spread of low-credibility content by social bots. Nature communications 
[online], 2018 [cit. 2019-04-30]. ISSN 2041-1723. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC6246561/. 
20  CHESSEN, Matt. The Madcom Future. Washington: Atlantic Council, 2017. 
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campaigns - based on information about the recipient. These will be personalised based 
on information about our activities in the virtual space, and on information we might 
share in the virtual space about family and friends, political preferences, demographic 
data and hobbies. Madcom tools will be able to come up with a very convincing and 
manipulative form of communication, able to target our vulnerabilities and detect our 
emotions in real time.
A newly discussed threat is also presented by deep fakes, which consist of audio or 
video of real people appearing to say or do things they never actually said or did. Origi-
nally, deep fake technology was used in the porn industry – faces of famous people were 
added into pornographic films. Replacing one person’s face with another’s using hype-
rrealist digital technology is a very accomplished illusion, based on deep machine lear-
ning. Beyond learning a person’s movements and expressions, the machine also clones 
their voice and can make them appear to say anything – even words that the artificial 
intelligence had not learned directly. This technology has been marketed by companies 
such as Baidu, iSpeech and Lyrebird, which offered it for commercial purposes (for exam-
ple, for human-machine interfaces). The Siri and Alexa digital assistants provide a gene-
rally known example of cloning a voice using machine learning.
There are a number of threats implied by the abuse of deep fake technology and the 
security risks are very high. Deep fakes exploit the same cognitive processes (and their 
weaknesses) as disinformation. They rely on the same processes of receiving informa-
tion as any other communication and we can say that deep fakes are more dangerous 
than text, as we are more likely to believe video than text. Video seems naturally to 
guarantee the trustworthiness of information and are commonly used as proof that par-
ticular utterances were made. One question is: what will happen to video and audio 
material as evidence in judicial processes? To top it all, machine learning makes deep 
fake a technology that is very difficult to detect.
Bobby Chesney and Danielle Citron21 identified several possible negative effects from 
deep fakes. Individuals and organisations, they say, might be abused, blackmailed or 
sabotaged. Nearly anyone could be blackmailed using a deep fake – whether for money, 
trade secrets, or any other information of a sensitive nature. Only a few hundred pho-
tographs of the person from social networks are needed to create a convincing video. 
Deep fake video depicting Barack Obama speaking about the dangers of disinformation 
needed 56 hours of recordings in order to create a plausible simulation of the ex-presi-
dent’s voice22. Deep fakes could also be used to falsely associate a person with another 
person, product, service or idea – an association that might not happen in the real world. 
Deep fakes and other tools based on machine learning may damage not just people 
and legal entities; they may even have a very negative impact on society itself. Based on 
the analysis of Chesney and Citron, we can identify these threats, some of them very 
relevant in the context of vulnerability or resilience of security/armed forces:
21  CHESNEY, Bobby, CITRON, Danielle. Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National 
Security. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018. ISSN 1556-5068. 
22  Bloomberg. How Faking Videos Became Easy – And Why That’s So Scary. Fortune [online]. 11 September 
2018 [cit. 2019-04-30]. Available at: http://fortune.com/2018/09/11/deep-fakes-obama-video/.
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1) Disruption of democratic discourse and of trust in institutions
A substantial volume of disinformation damages democracy, aiming to undermine 
trust in the democratic system, consisting of political institutions and constitutional and 
political officials. Disinformation narratives seek to create the impression that political 
representatives betray their voters and misgovern, or to create an atmosphere where 
everyone lies and nobody can be trusted. Deep fakes will only make matters worse. Let 
us imagine, for instance, deep fake video or audio capturing law enforcement officials 
discussing possible ways of abusing their powers.
2) Manipulating elections
Disinformation plays a very conspicuous role at times of elections, entering the public 
discourse with increased frequency and aiming to influence the voters and outcome of 
the elections. 
3) Artificial increase of conflict in society
It can be expected that this technology will be abused to increase or escalate tensions 
between various groups in the population, be they social, ethnic or religious. False infor-
mation about the migration crisis, terrorist attacks in Europe (or Czechia) or support for 
radical Islam, are some obvious examples. For instance, let us imagine a deep fake video 
of a Muslim who in a Czech mosque openly supports ISIS or another terrorist organisa-
tion, and the possible consequences of such a video going viral. 
4) Dangers to public security
Conflicts in society are only a small step away from dangers to public security. It is 
very easy to create panic with a gunshot, and a deep fake can work similarly in the virtual 
word (and from there, of course, such panic may be transferred into the real world). In 
the least harmful scenario, the panic creates financial damage; in the worse case, dam-
age to property, accidents or deaths. Chesney and Citron23 cite an example of intentional 
disinformation issued by a Russian research agency, which claimed that there had been a 
chemical disaster in Louisiana and an Ebola outbreak in Atlanta. The real damage caused 
by this disinformation was ultimately minimal, as both stories lacked proof and the facts 
were easy to verify. However, deep fake video and audio materials can potentially sub-
stantially improve the plausibility of disinformation. 
5) Undermining diplomacy
Deep fakes could also seriously disrupt diplomatic relations. Words could be put in the 
mouths of political representatives that have never been uttered. Pressure could then 
be created to respond rapidly, causing damage in international relations and increasing 
the likelihood of a conflict breaking out. International relations could be disrupted by 
23  CHESNEY, Bobby, CITRON, Danielle. Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National 
Security. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018. ISSN 1556-5068.
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the publication of a video on the internet of army officers committing war crimes during 
their mission abroad. 
6) Dangers to national security
The use of deep fakes to create danger to public security and to disrupt international 
relations can be thought of as threats to national security. We have encountered well 
developed propaganda from Daesh and the successor to Daesh might use deep fakes 
to create an ‘alternative reality’ in which their own fighters are strong and invincible. 
By contrast, armies or intelligence services might come under political or public pres-
sure demanding the curtailing of their powers and greater control over them. This might 
happen when audio or video materials are published purporting to show that army or 
intelligence agency had abused their powers.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Information and psychological operations are powerful instruments of warfare. Ne-
vertheless, as has been demonstrated information and psychological operations have 
also become important instruments during peacetime and they have become a crucial 
part of what is called hybrid warfare, irregular warfare or asymmetric conflict (as the 
reader wishes). However, the Western /NATO military think about information and psy-
chological operations in their own way in contrast to their Eastern equivalents, which 
have a more holistic and complex view. The Western thinking is more military-opera-
tions-focused, associating information operations exclusively with military operations. 
With psychological operations it is even more complicated. Psyops are here to support 
the aims of military operations, i.e. they are related to military affairs. Nevertheless, it 
is also said that psyops mean purposeful psychological influencing of target groups, ca-
rried out in peace and in wartime. Psyops play the role of a sub-category, but they also 
overlap with information operations. Based on this less-than-exact definition of mutual 
relations, and also due to the realities of conducting hybrid warfare (under the threshold 
of what is officially recognised as armed conflict, and preferring non-military tools) by 
a variety of state and non-state actors, the redefinition of information operations should 
be discussed in terms of expanding the definition in peacetime. 
Also psyops deserve terminological redefinition so that they do not overlap with stra-
tegic communication, or are not narrowed down to white psyops only. The current defi-
nition reflects the democratic approach, which says that covert actions, deception and 
propaganda do not belong in the toolbox of democracies. Such an approach prevents us 
from being able to react to the toolbox of our adversaries, who do not apply the same 
approach. We do not need to be afraid that the redefinition means a green light for 
democracies to use such tools. It just creates space for better understanding our adver-
saries and for developing counter-measures. 
Last but not least, as was demonstrated in the article, defence and security esta-
blishments should also react to the existing vulnerability of our own security/armed 
forces at the information-psychological level. In military affairs, a lot of attention is paid 
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to the information-technical level, but not necessarily enough is paid to the information-
-psychological level. We should be aware that it is not only the general public, but also 
military and security staff who are vulnerable and recognised as potential targets to be 
psychologically influenced by adversaries. Since psyops exploit fear, play with emotions 
and the cognitive dimension, it is necessary to build resilience also in this area. 
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